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ABSTRACT 
Infrastructure can be unreliable and administration 
subject to corruption in Asia’s rapidly emerging 
economies. This context presented Singapore with 
unique opportunities to export its ‘positive reputation’ 
to locations where these attributes are less certain. The 
strategic initiative is premised on the perception that 
Singapore’s good relations with multinationals, as 
well as ‘guanxi’, or connections, with Asian business 
networks, will give the industrial-township projects a 
marketing advantage. To complement the extensive 
literature on Singapore’s flagship projects in Indonesia 
and China, this paper takes a closer look at 
Singapore’s lesser-known project in Vietnam. 
Evidence from on-site surveys is presented. It finds 
that progress in this privileged foreign investment 
zone remains stymied by particular dependencies and 
challenges.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Singapore’s regionalization strategy comprised state-
led infrastructure projects, and a range of incentives 
and regulatory innovations designed to assist private 
companies and individuals move overseas. The 
program involved the establishment of industrial 
townships to create a ‘Singapore-styled’ business 
environment for local and Singapore-based multi-
national companies (MNCs) to expand regionally. The 
Singapore government, in this instance, takes the 
initiative to develop regional sites as locations to 
access resources and markets. This strategic 
manoeuvre is premised on the perception that the 
redistribution of economic activities to regional 
industrial sites will enhance the collective 
competitiveness of Singapore-based companies that 
redistribute their resource-dependent operations to 
these sites, as well as Singapore’s own 
competitiveness as a high-value investment location 
with strategic linkages to the region. Singapore’s 
regionalization program is intended to set in place a 
strategic configuration for Singapore to concentrate on 
higher value-added activities, and yet retain important 
linkages with production centres in low-cost 
environments. Concurrently, Singapore lends its 
competitive strengths, in industrial infrastructural 
development and management, to these regional sites 
to enhance their competitiveness. 
 
Private sector reluctance in regionalizing was the 
Government’s raison d’être that Singapore’s 
government linked companies (GLCs) should lead the 
regionalization drive. The Government’s role in the 
township developments was three-pronged. First, 
senior politicians and civil servants negotiated the 
institutional framework for the project, which 
typically involved garnering special investment 
conditions in the host location. Second, Singapore 
government agencies and GLCs were the prime 
investors in the infrastructure and real estate 
development, usually via a ‘government-selected’ 
consortium. The prominence of government agencies 
and government-linked companies reflected the scale 
and long pay-back periods for infrastructure, which 
may make the investment unattractive to private 
companies alone. The third role played by the state 
was in the marketing and promotion of the parks. 
 
VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
VSIP is Singapore’s flagship investment in Vietnam. 
The park follows the physical design of Singapore’s 
first overseas industrial township, Batamindo 
Industrial Park (BIP). However, the motivation for the 
VSIP project was more diffused. In the Indonesia 
scenario, the primary objective had been to synergise 
the complementarities of neighbouring economies and 
to promote the restructuring of the Singapore economy 
[4] [6]. Conversely, the VSIP project was based on the 
perception that Singapore agencies have the 
competitive edge in infrastructure development and, 
like the Suzhou-Wuxi ‘experiments’ in China, had a 
pseudo-economic objective to demonstrate the 
transferability of the BIP-prototype to other Asian 
environments [7] [9]. 
  
Prior to the launch of VSIP in May 1995, a total of 13 
international companies with investments worth 
US$80 million reportedly indicated their interest in the 
Park. VSIP had, by November 1998, attracted US$370 
million in investments and 30 investors from 10 
different countries investing in a broad swathe of 
industries, viz, food, electrical and electronics, 
pharmaceuticals and healthcare, speciality materials, 
consumer goods and light industries. Cumulative 
investment commitments topped US$400 million from 
33 companies in 1999. Investor interest has since 
tapered off, with immediate prospects for growth 
focused on the possible expansion of the initial 
investors. Investment commitments in VSIP are 
currently valued at over US$500 million from 64 
tenants, 53 of which are in operation. VSIP has yet to 
post a profit. 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Much analysis on the Parks has relied primarily on 
secondary data from official publications, press 
reports, etc. To obtain primary data on the differential 
impact of various pull factors on firms’ investment 
decisions, along with the differential impact of 
different types of constraints on their operations, we 
applied the questionnaire developed in Yeoh, et al [8] 
and surveyed the tenants in three of Singapore’s 
overseas industrial parks. This section presents the 
detailed findings of our fieldwork, with an evaluation 
of the applicability of related economic theory. 
 
Questionnaire Survey 
The eclectic paradigm, suggested by Dunning [1] was 
used to explain the ability and willingness of firms to 
serve markets, and to look into the reasons for their 
choice of exploiting this advantage through foreign 
production rather than domestic production, exports or 
portfolio resource flows through the interaction of 
Ownership-specific advantages, Internalization-
incentive advantages, and Location-specific 
advantages. Foreign investment will occur only if it is 
advantageous to combine spatially transferable 
intermediate products produced in the home country, 
with at least some immobile factor endowments or 
other intermediate products in another country [2].  
This theory has been extended, in more recent 
literature, to deliberations on the presence of immobile 
clusters of complementary value-added activities [5], 
and the transactional benefits of spatial proximity [3]. 
Using this approach, it is not difficult to see that 
numerous firms in VSIP already possessed a 
significant amount of Ownership-specific and 
Internalization-incentive advantages. Even so, they 
must also enjoy Location-specific advantages to 
reasonably justify a decision to engage in FDI into 
Vietnam. Vietnam offers these firms the final essential 
ingredient of Location-specific advantages, spurring 
these firms to engage in foreign direct investment in 
the country.  
 
The questionnaire was designed as a comparative 
study with two other industrial parks to investigate the 
various factors influencing firms' investment decisions 
along with the problems faced by their operations. The 
survey focused on three main areas. Firstly, the basic 
profile of the respondent: type of ownership, nature of 
operations, number of employees, sales turnover and 
its market orientation. Secondly, the factors that 
attracted the respondents to invest in the park. Data on 
various constraints were gathered in the third section. 
 
Questionnaire surveys were conducted in Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and India, from December 2002 to June 
2003. A total of 83 responses were collected from 
industrial park tenants. Of these, 27 were located in 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) in Indonesia, 23 were 
located in VSIP in Vietnam, and the remaining 33 
were located in International Technology Park Limited 
(ITPL) in Bangalore, India. 
 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and 
popular rankings on the responses relating to factors 
and constraints, the logit model was applied to 
compare the push/pull factors influencing the tenants’ 
decision to locate in the Parks and the constraints 
faced by the Parks. The logit model, estimated by the 
maximum likelihood, takes the following form: 
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Where:  
Pi = probability of firm being located in the particular 
park 
Zi is a linear function of the push/pull factors defined 
as   
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Where:  
Fi (1 to 6, depending on the type of push/pull factor) = 
1 if factor i is selected, 0 otherwise 
α0 = constant term 
αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
A similar logit model was applied to the constraints 
faced by the parks’ tenants: 
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Where: 
Pi is the probability of firm being located in the 
particular park 
Zi is a linear function of the constraints defined as  
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Where:  
Ci (1 to n, depending on the type of constraint) = 1 if 
constraint i is selected, 0 otherwise 
β
 0 = constant term 
β
 i = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decision to 
Invest in VSIP 
Singapore leverages on its infrastructure development 
expertise and the low-cost labor available in the host 
environments to market its industrial parks. It 
supplements these purported advantages with its 
political commitment to the Parks, as demonstrated by 
the many bilateral agreements between the GLCs and 
host governments or politically-linked business 
conglomerates. Furthermore, there is a host of 
investment incentives that entice multinationals to 
locate their lower value-added activities in these self-
contained enclaves.  
 
Using the method of popular ranking, the most 
frequently cited factor for locating in VSIP, as 
presented in Table 1, was the infrastructure facilities. 
Singapore appears to have succeeded in exporting its 
‘expertise’ in infrastructure development and creating 
a Location-advantage which is clearly in demand by 
companies in the South East Asian region. 
 
Political commitment from the Singapore government 
is not a concern for VSIP firms, with only 3 
respondents citing it as an affirmative pull factor, and 
as indicated by a negative and significant α1 (=-
1.602), a surprising statistic given the country’s 
instability. Vietnam had many military conflicts with 
nearly all her neighbours, and prior to that, had gained 
her independence after the Vietnam War with the 
United States. Despite the doi moi policy, the 
government still retains tight control over the 
economy, and dictates the nature of FDIs into the 
country. This new evidence suggests that companies 
which invest in Vietnam are more concerned with the 
operational conditions in VSIP such as the reliable 
Singapore-styled infrastructure facilities than with the 
Singapore government’s commitment to the success of 
the Park. 
 
TABLE 1: Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decisions to 
Invest in VSIP (by Popular Rankings and Maximum 
Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit 2-tailed tests) 
 
Variables Frequency α i 
Political commitment from the 
S’pore government 3 -1.602** 
Political commitment from the host 
government 7 -0.706 
Investment incentives 12 -0.095 
Competitive labor costs 11 0.882 
Reliable infrastructure facilities 16 -0.309 
Availability of skilled/educated labor 6 0.720 
 
Note: * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level 
Source: Questionnaire survey 
 
Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations 
in VSIP 
Although VSIP had successfully attracted a significant 
amount of FDI, there exist some factors that act to 
undermine the attractiveness of the industrial park. 
These constraints are categorized into three broad 
groups, namely, those relating to labor, those relating 
to organization and technology, and those relating to 
the economic ‘environment’, such as government 
policies and regulations. 
 
Unlike BIP, VSIP tenants are not as concerned about 
labor costs, as indicated by the negative and 
significant β3 (=-3.658) in Table 2. Instead, many 
VSIP tenants surveyed (74%) cited shortage of 
professionals and managers as a labor constraint, 
further substantiated by our logistic regression model 
where β2 (=2.462) is positive and significant. Another 
frequently cited labor constraints was the shortage of 
semi-skilled or skilled labor (52%), a clue that VSTTC 
graduates may not be equipped with the relevant skill-
sets sought by tenants. 
 
The Singapore-styled infrastructure, though reliable 
and efficient, also proved to be costly in BIP and 
ITPL, as facilities such as the power plant, waste-
treatment system and water supply are independently 
managed. However, the costs of maintaining the 
infrastructure appears to be well-managed in VSIP, as 
indicated by the negative and highly significant β5 (=-
2.466). 
 
TABLE 2: Major Constraints on the Respondents’ 
Operations in VSIP (by Popular Rankings and Maximum 
Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit 2-tailed tests) 
 
Variables Frequency β i 
Labor constraints 
Shortage of semi-skilled and skilled 
labor 12 -0.119 
Shortage of professionals and 
managers 17 2.462* 
Rising labor costs 1 -3.658* 
Others 4 -0.673 
Organizational and Technological constraints 
Difficulty in obtaining capital 
equipment 6 0.925 
Difficulty in introducing new 
technology and techniques 5 -0.293 
Lack of good supporting services 5 -0.874 
Difficulty in securing funds for 
expansion 2 -1.013 
High and/or rising overhead costs 5 -2.466* 
Others 5 -0.192 
Environmental constraints 
Impact of host government regulations 11 -0.485 
Competition from overseas industry 
competitors 11 0.104 
Others 7 0.846 
 
Note:  * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level 
Source: Questionnaire survey  
 
CONCLUSION 
The strategic alliances between Singapore’s GLCs and 
its counterparts in the regional sites, were instrumental 
in mobilizing the resources to complete these multi-
million projects. Nonetheless, as most openly 
admitted, the enormous tangible (and intangible) 
resources mobilized through the strategic partnerships, 
have ‘failed’ to shield these projects from a gamut of 
problems.  
 
Heightened competition 
Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are increasingly 
facing strong mounting competition from competing 
parks within their vicinity. VSIP’s attractiveness has 
been eroded by competition from newer, albeit 
smaller, industrial parks developed by experienced 
and street-savvy developers from Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan. These competitor parks market themselves 
aggressively on price, charging significantly lower 
rentals for ‘no frills’ land space. The economics of 
heightened competition have called into question the 
premium attached to the ‘superior infrastructure’ in 
low-cost industrial-investment enclaves like VSIP. As 
well, the Park was launched at the same time as 
Singapore’s other flagship projects in China. VSIP 
struggles to maintain investor interest.  The Park has 
yet to prove its economic feasibility vis-à-vis other 
regional sites, notably like China and India, and the 
added attractions of their large domestic markets. 
 
Political ‘Patronage’   
Reliance on political patronage (and personal ties) 
rather than transparent contracts has had advantages 
and disadvantages. In VSIP, the ‘special’ support from 
the local authorities has proved to be less significant 
than initially thought. Improvements on infrastructural 
projects have translated into a plethora of 
miscellaneous fees, and added to operating costs. 
Corruption remains endemic. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that, while there is an interest in learning 
from Singapore, tensions have arisen over Singapore-
styled management practices, and these have 
translated into perception differences, protracted 
conflicts and project delays. Local sentiments towards 
the Singapore partners were not unlike those 
expressed in the Suzhou-Wuxi experience in China, 
albeit to a different degree. It is not inconceivable that 
the ownership-management structure of VSIP may, in 
time, be restructured to reflect a ‘better alignment of 
interests’. 
 
The Singapore government’s role in developing, 
managing and operating the overseas industrial parks 
has been crucial from the start. However, initial 
assumptions about the advantages engendered by 
state-led enterprise, as successfully proven through its 
GLC network domestically, were overly optimistic. 
Differing agendas, sometimes within the same host 
government, intertwined with the cultural and political 
complexities of emerging economies and the 
uncontrolled external environment, serve to diminish 
the efficiency and commercial viability of the case 
study park. The limits of cloning Singapore-styled 
‘industrial-townships’, beyond demarcated 
geographical boundaries, have been alluded to in this 
paper. 
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